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Richard D. Porter is a vice president, senior policy advisor, 
and the director of the payments team in the Financial 
Markets Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. 
In this special issue of Economic Perspectives, we 
present selected papers based on our recent conference, 
Payments Fraud: Perception Versus Reality, hosted by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago on June 5–6, 2008. 
The conference brought together decision-makers from 
the banking, payments, legal, regulatory, and merchant 
communities for a wide-ranging discussion of the threats 
to the security of the payments system and how those 
threats might best be addressed. 
The volume starts with an extensive summary of 
conference presentations, keynote addresses, and open 
floor discussions, written by Tiffany Gates and Katy 
Jacob. In order to give a sense of the intense back-and-
forth exchanges that took place during this day-and-a-
half-long event, the authors structure their summary 
around the broad themes of the discussion rather than 
simply presenting a chronological account. The themes 
are as follows: organizational structures for management 
of fraud risks; technological innovation; alignment of 
incentives for fraud prevention among consumers, mer-
chants, and payments providers; and regulatory policies.
Gates and Jacob’s article highlights the challenges 
involved in bringing the various constituencies together 
to forge common ways to address fraud in payments 
systems. Gates and Jacob find that payments fraud 
cannot be eliminated without decreasing the openness 
and efficiency of the payments system. In the current 
environment, technological innovations have enabled 
system participants to enhance payments security, at 
the same time that technology has made it easier for 
criminals to perpetrate payments fraud remotely. Practi-
tioners are constantly weighing the costs and benefits of 
payments fraud mitigation and are looking to the public 
sector to offer guidance and support. As the industry 
combats payments fraud, companies are banding to-
gether to find common solutions. For instance, through-
out the conference, financial industry participants 
emphasized the concept of enterprise-wide fraud 
management, while many also acknowledged the diffi-
culties faced by small merchants and many financial 
institutions in fashioning such holistic strategies. A 
number of legal professionals stressed the detrimental 
effects of legacy laws and regulations that evolved in-
dependently around individual payment product lines. 
Together, these viewpoints contributed to a budding 
consensus on the importance of dedicated high-level 
executive involvement in payments fraud management 
and of outsourcing development of fraud prevention 
tools to specialized entities.
The rest of this volume is devoted to articles that 
address in greater detail some of the key topics discussed 
at the conference. The contributors of these papers 
span the spectrum of thought leaders in combating 
payments fraud—industry experts in fraud detection 
systems, legal professionals, academic researchers in 
economics and technology, and senior officials of the 
Federal Reserve System.
The first article is written by Bruce J. Summers. 
His paper provides a synthesis of the approaches of 
practitioners and economists to thinking about the prob-
lems in containing retail payments fraud. As Summers 
makes clear, these approaches differ somewhat for 
reasons that have to do with both perspective and an-
alytical framework. Yet, both parties are integral in 
formulating a coherent public policy response to the 
problem of payments fraud.
In particular, payments industry practitioners tend 
to regard fraud as a persistent but manageable problem 
that requires both unrelenting attention and significant 
expenditures. These expenditures on fraud mitigation  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
have resulted in declining rates of fraud losses. Still, 
there is concern that maintaining such results in the 
future will require ever-expanding expenditures. Part 
of this argument rests on the view that fraud threats to 
electronic payments networks arise globally, are increas-
ingly sophisticated, and propagate quickly. The bottom 
line is that for the practitioners, payments fraud is part of 
the cost of doing business, which can be ameliorated 
by pooling fraud prevention efforts. To underscore this 
view, Summers reports consensus recommendations 
from a recent industry roundtable (which is a focus of 
the article by Malphrus later in this volume). Those 
recommendations call for information sharing, better 
authentication technologies, and adoption of standards—
ideas that take into account the economies of scale 
and scope in fraud prevention, though not necessarily 
the conflicting incentives among the many participants 
in payments networks. 
Economists tend to think of the payments system 
as a vast network of participants whose divergent incen-
tives generate considerable spillovers from their own 
actions. The effects of these spillovers are frequently 
not fully appreciated by the participants because mar-
ket prices fail to convey the extent of the spillovers to 
them. An example of such an “externality” is when a 
consumer (or merchant) fails to be appropriately vigi-
lant about data security because limited liability rules 
(or existing penalties for breaching network security 
protocols) do not signal the extent to which such actions 
affect other participants in the payments system. More-
over, because fraud prevention by one party usually 
improves the experience of everyone else, there is 
ample incentive for other participants to “freeload.” 
As a result, there may be drastic underprovision of 
fraud prevention in the aggregate. This framework 
forces economists to take a systemic view of payments 
networks, focusing on ways in which policy can better 
align the incentives of all participants. One important 
implication of this view is that incentives (or regula-
tion) must be appropriately allocated across the pay-
ments network because the entire system is only as 
strong as its “weakest link.”
The juxtaposition of the views of practitioners 
and academic economists gives rise to an interesting 
and provocative observation that industry practitioners’ 
relatively sanguine view of risk is partly attributed to 
their focus on practices of their own firms. Thought 
leaders in the industry are keenly aware that the inter-
connectedness between the many players in the pay-
ments space poses risks that are not directly observable 
by any individual participant. Yet, their primary respon-
sibility for managing fraud at their enterprises may in-
still a somewhat false sense of security. This comparison 
also points to a potentially key role of the Federal  
Reserve in bridging the gap, since it is both a research 
center and a major payments provider.
The next three articles in this volume are, in some 
sense, elaborations on Summers’ conclusion. The first 
of these, by William Roberds and Stacey L. Schreft, 
lays out an economic framework for thinking about 
fraud in payments networks. The second, by Steve 
Malphrus, gives the industry view on the current state 
of efforts in retail fraud management. The third, by 
Mark N. Greene, addresses the nature of payments 
fraud and the need for coordinated efforts in fighting it.
Roberds and Schreft start out by noting the inevi-
table trade-off between more efficient payments markets 
and loss of privacy. On the one hand, as an economy 
grows, paying for transactions in cash becomes prohib-
itively expensive and inefficient. On the other hand, 
credit- and debit-based transactions between parties that 
typically do not know each other are impossible without 
exchanging some information that verifies both the iden-
tity and the creditworthiness of the parties. The resulting 
transfer of information back and forth presents oppor-
tunities for fraud. Still, without such transmission of 
private information modern payments systems would 
be infeasible, thereby forcing payments activity onto the 
slower rails of cash-facilitated exchanges of yesteryear.
What is the proper balance then? As Roberds and 
Schreft argue, it is useful to think of this balance as “con-
fidentiality” of payments transactions. “Confidentiality” 
thus consists of “data informativeness” (how much 
identifying information is exchanged between parties) 
and “data integrity” (how well this information is pro-
tected). If you tilt the balance too much toward safe-
guarding privacy (that is, lessen data informativeness), 
then the wheels of credit-based and remote transac-
tions grind to a halt. But if you tilt it too much toward 
being absolutely certain about the identity and credit-
worthiness of the consumer, then you may transmit so 
much data that you increase the incidence of and losses 
from fraud.
To get closer to the answer, the authors lean on 
economic theory. They note that neither information 
nor integrity diminishes with repeated use. For example, 
say Wal-Mart knows Mr. A is not a fraudulent actor 
and, therefore, processes payments it receives from him. 
The fact that Wal-Mart has this information does not 
diminish the value of the information to Home Depot. 
These seemingly abstract concepts matter because 
they help us think about the way in which “confiden-
tiality” can be provided efficiently. In particular, the 
fact that the two attributes of “confidentiality” do not 
wear down with consequent use implies that, at some 
point, the marginal cost of providing it is close to zero.  1Q/009, Economic Perspectives
This insight implies that optimally there will be 
only a few large producers of “confidentiality” that 
are able to leverage vast economies of scale in build-
ing networks for collecting and transmitting necessary 
information securely (for example, credit bureaus, 
card networks, and so on). However, since informa-
tion must be exchanged among many different parties 
(for example, merchants, issuers, and consumers) in 
order to have value, the potential for conflicts of inter-
est is large. Some parties may have weaker incentives 
to safeguard information and thus become the “weak 
link” that compromises the entire system. Some par-
ties may choose to freeload on data integrity efforts 
of others because the cost of fraud or loss of “confiden-
tiality” is not proportionately allocated. 
The authors’ analysis of “confidentiality” further 
points to the proper role for policymakers in fostering 
efficient (but not fraud-free) payments systems. Public 
policy should aim to resolve the potential for conflicts 
of interest through coordination, judicious imposition 
of standards, and proper allocation of legal incentives 
(as discussed in greater detail in Douglass’s article lat-
er in this volume). The public sector should not focus 
on duplicating the job done by the private sector in 
collecting, verifying, and processing payments-related 
information. As Roberds and Schreft underscore, the 
ultimate goal of regulators should be to strike the 
proper balance between privacy and efficiency. 
Malphrus’s article summarizes the results from  
a special roundtable discussion on retail payments 
fraud, which was held at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis in March 2007. The participants reported 
that, despite the declining use of checks, check payments 
still generated the largest number of fraud attempts. 
They emphasized that criminals are continually search-
ing for weaknesses in fraud detection and prevention 
practices. Many thought that banks and businesses 
needed to adopt a holistic approach to detecting and 
preventing retail payments fraud, being ever mindful 
of the overall fraud landscape across all of their oper-
ations. The roundtable participants shared a number 
of suggestions for improving the industry’s ability to 
detect and prevent retail payments fraud, including 
better protection of customers’ personal and financial 
data. They recommended more effective sharing of best 
practices with respect to fraud detection and prevention 
within the industry. Industry leaders specifically discussed 
the effectiveness of PIN (personal identification num-
ber) and chip technology. Some stated that fraud rates 
on PIN debit cards are significantly lower than those for 
other payment types, and advocated a more widespread 
application of PIN security to card payments. 
Malphrus also shares some thoughts on new ac-
count fraud that has featured prominently in recent 
discussions on retail payments systems’ vulnerabilities. 
Allowing customers to open accounts electronically, 
as opposed to in person at a bank, clearly offers the 
potential for fraud. However, this risk can be mitigated 
by making use of various technologies; for example, 
software can identify the geographical location of the 
user’s computer, and device identification tests can be 
subjected to further fraud screening. All of these tech-
nologies are currently operational, and their widespread 
adoption is likely to make a considerable difference in 
mitigating a particular aspect of retail payments fraud.
Malphrus also highlights an increasingly impor-
tant aspect of policymaking—the need to protect pri-
vacy while countering terrorist financing and money 
laundering. As different agencies (for example, the 
Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Reserve) 
cooperate to combat these threats, they must be vigilant 
about how they exchange information about U.S.  
citizens. Moreover, as those perpetrating illicit activities 
increasingly attempt to leverage existing payments 
networks, the need for cooperation between the private 
sector and government agencies becomes all the  
more important. 
The next contributor, Greene, represents Fair Isaac 
Corporation—a leading provider of automated identi-
fication procedures for prospective fraud on electronic 
payments networks. Greene’s role gives him a clear 
perspective on the nature of the current threats to the 
payments system. As Greene argues in his article, greater 
cooperation among the various payments system par-
ticipants is necessary to combat fraud. Increasingly, 
modern day fraudsters operate globally, often outside 
the jurisdiction of the U.S., and they are well organized 
and well financed.
In particular, Greene warns that adopting piece-
meal solutions that focus on individual payments seg-
ments or regions would be inadequate to beat the scams. 
While payments providers may have an incentive to 
differentiate their products and seek competitive ad-
vantage, they need to find ways to cooperate with each 
other in sharing information or developing standards 
that would help lessen the problem. He suggests that 
piecemeal solutions are like pushing on a balloon—
they may impede fraud in the particular targeted seg-
ment or region but quite often at the expense of 
increasing fraud elsewhere. 
Instead, Greene advocates a fraud protection  
system that works like a burglar alarm, covering all 
the openings—“doors and windows”—since fraud-
sters will always make the most of the weakest link. 
He argues it is possible to build better models of fraud  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
containment that profile not only individuals but also 
devices and merchants. With this platform, one could 
successfully identify uncharacteristic and possibly 
fraudulent payment behavior. Such modeling exercises 
would be more effective if they could be “trained” 
(that is, estimated on large amounts of current real-
world data); this might require the cooperation of 
various payments system participants. Some public 
sector cooperation might be desirable to remove the 
concern that such industry data-sharing exercises 
constituted collusive practices.
In the question-and-answer session that followed 
Greene’s keynote address at the conference, Greene 
raised the possibility of a mass compromise to the 
payments system by fraudsters. In a typical card com-
promise where the information could be stolen for, 
say, 25,000 cards, Greene acknowledged there is of-
ten only a limited amount of resulting damage—per-
haps on the order of 400 fraudulent transactions. He 
suggested that the outcome could be considerably 
larger, with perhaps as many as 4 million fraudulent 
transactions generated on the same (25,000) card base. 
In this circumstance, Greene argued the systemic risk 
to payments could be huge. Moreover, he stressed that 
the industry is not prepared to deal with such a contin-
gency. This might require a joint public–private ini-
tiative to scope out the problem and propose solutions.
The next article in this volume, by Duncan B. 
Douglass, takes us back to the central role that proper 
allocation of incentives plays in the efficient function-
ing of payments systems. Douglass focuses on ways in 
which the current framework of public laws and private 
network rules distributes fraud liability among the three 
principal sets of participants—consumers, merchants, 
and card issuers. Although the discussion centers on 
signature-based credit and debit cards, its implications 
are readily extended to other payments instruments.
The public law framework that governs the legal 
liability for fraud losses is based on the Truth in Lending 
Act (TILA) and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act 
(EFTA), as well as the associated Federal Reserve 
Board Regulations Z and E. As Douglass points out, 
the primary goal of these laws and rules is to effec-
tively absolve the consumer from liability for losses 
related to fraud, regardless of whether a consumer’s 
own behavior contributed to fraud in the first place. 
Although a lack of care on the part of consumers often 
contributes to fraud, Douglass argues that making 
consumers bear more of the consequences for their 
actions is not realistic. This owes both to the political 
environment and, more importantly, to the desire to 
instill confidence in the security of card transactions 
among consumers. 
The private card networks’ rules take over from 
where public laws stop—by setting cardholder liability 
to zero—and proceed to further allocate fraud loss  
liability between merchants and card issuers. In brief, 
the rules effectively assign liability for losses in card-
present transactions to issuers and in card-not-present 
transactions to merchants. Douglass emphasizes that 
this joint framework of public laws and private rules 
leads to several predictable outcomes that make system-
wide fraud prevention efforts somewhat inefficient. 
To paraphrase, consumers never care too much about 
safeguarding their transactions, merchants try to exer-
cise due diligence primarily in card-not-present envi-
ronments, and card issuers are concerned mostly with 
point-of-sale transactions. Each party thus has ample 
incentives to undermine the efforts of the other—for 
example, merchants not verifying signatures at the 
point of sale.
Douglass illustrates this dynamic with the example 
of the failed adoption of networks’ payer authentica-
tion programs. Although these programs are effective 
in reducing online fraud, consumers, who bear no  
responsibility for fraud, have balked at merchants’  
efforts to adopt these measures. For their part, card 
issuers, which bear less of a burden for fraud in card-
not-present transactions, were content to sit on the 
sidelines and not force their customers to enroll in 
such programs.
The final article in the volume, by Kevin Fu, 
Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin, Daniel V. Bailey,  
Ari Juels, and Tom O’Hare, focuses on technological 
vulnerabilities in a newly popular set of payments in-
struments—devices that use RFID (radio frequency 
identification), such as credit cards. Such cards offer 
the promise of speedier contactless transactions at the 
checkout or gas station and, unlike traditional magnetic 
stripe cards, require only physical proximity between 
the card and the associated reader. 
Fu and his co-authors demonstrate that the more 
convenient retail experience provided by RFID devices 
over magnetic stripe cards may come at the price of 
several vulnerabilities in RFID’s first-generation in-
carnations. Using their toolkit as electrical engineers, 
the authors find that all of the 20 million RFID-enabled 
cards currently in circulation are subject to privacy 
invasion. The cards can be scanned and private infor-
mation can be removed by the fraudsters without the 
awareness or consent of the cardholders.
These vulnerabilities should not necessarily be 
viewed as a fatal indictment of the technology; rather, 
they represent what might be expected for a work  
in progress. If successful, RFID technology will over-
come these vulnerabilities along its developmental path.  1Q/009, Economic Perspectives
NOTES
New (and ultimately successful) payments innovations 
do not necessarily provide full fraud protection capa-
bilities at launch but often gain them over time as they 
scale up efficiently. The history of PayPal illustrates 
this point quite nicely.1 We hope that the message de-
livered by Fu and his co-authors will rouse the card 
manufacturers to address these challenges quickly. 
Each of the articles collected in this volume offers 
a specific insight into the current state of efforts in com-
bating retail payments fraud. The articles also outline 
1Sujit Chakravorti and Carrie Jankowski, 2005, “Forces shaping 
the payments environment: A summary of the Chicago Fed’s 2005 
Payments Conference,” Chicago Fed Letter, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Chicago, No. 219a, October, p. 2.
a number of ways in which these efforts can be made 
more successful at a systemwide level and offer a 
methodological framework for thinking about the 
problem. We hope this work will provide a valuable 
basis for ongoing discussions on how we can develop 
and coordinate public and private responses to the 
pressing need to manage payments fraud risk. 